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authorTim Rühsen <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>2018-04-27 10:41:56 +0200
committerTim Rühsen <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>2018-05-06 18:24:58 +0200
commit1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd (patch)
tree87e8787f27138e418eeed26c8d388d18d9523248
parentf51936745aab064c4342eba1e049d4df45fa09f0 (diff)
downloadwget-1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd.tar.gz
Fix cookie injection (CVE-2018-0494)
* src/http.c (resp_new): Replace \r\n by space in continuation lines Fixes #53763 "Malicious website can write arbitrary cookie entries to cookie jar" HTTP header parsing left the \r\n from continuation line intact. The Set-Cookie code didn't check and could be tricked to write \r\n into the cookie jar, allowing a server to generate cookies at will.
-rw-r--r--src/http.c18
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/src/http.c b/src/http.c
index c8960f1..77bdbbe 100644
--- a/src/http.c
+++ b/src/http.c
@@ -613,9 +613,9 @@ struct response {
resp_header_*. */
static struct response *
-resp_new (const char *head)
+resp_new (char *head)
{
- const char *hdr;
+ char *hdr;
int count, size;
struct response *resp = xnew0 (struct response);
@@ -644,15 +644,23 @@ resp_new (const char *head)
break;
/* Find the end of HDR, including continuations. */
- do
+ for (;;)
{
- const char *end = strchr (hdr, '\n');
+ char *end = strchr (hdr, '\n');
+
if (end)
hdr = end + 1;
else
hdr += strlen (hdr);
+
+ if (*hdr != ' ' && *hdr != '\t')
+ break;
+
+ // continuation, transform \r and \n into spaces
+ *end = ' ';
+ if (end > head && end[-1] == '\r')
+ end[-1] = ' ';
}
- while (*hdr == ' ' || *hdr == '\t');
}
DO_REALLOC (resp->headers, size, count + 1, const char *);
resp->headers[count] = NULL;